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Abstract We apply the well-known Condorcet criterion from voting theory outside
of its classical framework and link it with spanning trees of an undirected graph. In
situations in which a network, represented by a spanning tree of an undirected graph,
needs to be installed, decision-makers typically do not agree on the network to be
implemented. Instead, each of these decision-makers has her own ideal conception of
the network. In order to derive a group decision, i.e., a single spanning tree for the
entire group of decision-makers, the goal would be a spanning tree that beats each
other spanning tree in a simple majority comparison. When comparing two dedicated
spanning trees, a decision-maker will be considered to be more satisfied with the one
that is “closer” to her proposal. In this context, the most basic and natural measure of
distance is the usual set difference: we simply count the number of edges the spanning
tree has in common with the proposal of the decision-maker. In this work, we show
that it is computationally intractable to decide (1) if such a spanning tree exists, and
(2) if a given spanning tree satisfies the Condorcet criterion.
Keywords Spanning tree · Condorcet · Computational complexity · Social choice
theory
1 Introduction
Dating back more than two centuries (Condorcet 1785), the Condorcet criterion is
one of the fundamental and most important concepts in voting theory (see Brams and
Fishburn 2002 for a survey). Originally formulated for single winner elections, the
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criterion states that, if an alternative exists that wins1 by a simple majority against
each other alternative in a pairwise comparison, that alternative should be declared the
winner of the election. The Condorcet criterion has been generalized to the election of
committees in several ways, e.g., by Fishburn (1981), Gehrlein (1985), Kaymak and
Sanver (2003), and more recently by Elkind et al. (2014) and Darmann (2013a).
In the last decades, researchers have started to use the Condorcet criterion outside of
its classical framework, often under the label of popularity. In particular, this has been
done in the context of a popular matching in a bipartite graph, i.e., a matching which
beats each other matching in the graph in a simple majority comparison (see, e.g.,
Gärdenfors 1975). In that respect, a lot of works are concerned with the computational
complexity involved in finding such a popular matching, examples being the works
of Abraham et al. (2005), Biró et al. (2010), and Huang and Kavitha (2011). In another
recent work, Zuylen et al. (2014) consider the problem of finding a popular ranking
from a computational viewpoint. In their framework, given a set of alternatives, each
member of a set of agents proposes her ideal solution, i.e., individual ranking of the
alternatives. The goal is to find a ranking π meeting the property that there is no other
ranking π ′ which beats π in a simple majority comparison. In Zuylen et al. (2014),
these comparisons are performed by measuring the distance of the considered ranking
to each of the agents’ rankings by means of the Kendall-tau distance.
We apply the Condorcet criterion to spanning trees of an undirected graph. Finding
spanning trees in an undirected graph is a central task in operations research, with
numerous applications in the construction of physical networks such as telecommu-
nication networks, power transmission lines, and pipeline or highway systems (see
also Ahuja et al. 1993). In this paper, we consider the situation in which such a net-
work needs to be installed. Typically, however, the corresponding decision-makers
involved do not agree on the network. Instead, each of them decides on her own ideal
solution, i.e., spanning tree, which she proposes. Clearly, each of the decision-makers
would like to see her ideal spanning tree being implemented, which is impossible
except in the trivial case of all decision-makers proposing the same spanning tree.
Now, it is natural to assume that, when considering two dedicated spanning trees,
each of the decision-makers will be more happy with the one that is “closer” to her
proposal. The most basic and natural measure of distance in this context is to simply
count the number of edges the spanning tree has in common with the proposal of
the decision-maker, i.e., to consider the usual set difference. Finally, to decide on an
overall solution for the whole group of decision-makers, the well-studied Condorcet
criterion is a meaningful and plausible criterion.
As an illustrative example we consider the member states of the European Union
deciding on the layout of a communication network (e.g., a high security connection
of law enforcement agencies) or a crucial supply network such as a gas or oil pipeline.
These networks are generally designed as spanning trees connecting all countries rep-
resented by vertices in a graph. The decision-makers could be the countries themselves,
or board members of some EU institution. For political and historical reasons involv-
ing trust, self-interest, or stability concerns, different decision-makers have different
1 Respectively, in its weaker version, does not lose by a simple majority against any other alternative in a
pairwise comparison
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perceptions which links (i.e., edges) between the countries should be used in order to
establish the whole network. In particular, the decision-makers could have different
conceptions of the entire network because of political relations and alliances (espe-
cially in case the decision-makers are the countries themselves), or due to concerns
regarding the security of supply and political stability. In addition, different decision-
makers could base their conceptions on different criteria, which typically results in
differing networks. Finding a plausible solution which takes into account the interests
of all the decision-makers in such a setting is clearly an important aggregation task.
In principle, we are thus concerned with the aggregation of spanning trees of an
undirected graph into a single spanning tree. Hence, this work is somewhat related to
the axiomaticallymotivatedwork ofEndriss andGrandi (2012),where, in a preference-
based environment, each member of a set of agents proposes a directed graph, which
need to be aggregated into a single graph.More formally, similar to the work of Zuylen
et al. (2014), in our framework each member of a set of agents proposes her favourite
solution, i.e., spanning tree of the graph. Now, a (weak) Condorcet tree is a spanning
tree T such that for each other spanning tree T ′, T beats (is not beaten by) T ′ in a
pairwise majority comparison. In order to perform these comparisons, we measure the
distance between two spanning trees by means of the set difference. In this work, we
consider two natural decision problems in connection with a (weak) Condorcet tree
from a computational perspective. In the first one, we consider the question if such a
spanning tree exists. In the second problem, we ask if a given specific spanning tree
is a (weak) Condorcet tree.
The first question is related to the work of Darmann (2014), where instead of
applying the Condorcet criterion, the goal is to find a spanning tree which does not
deviate from each of the individual spanning trees by more than a given number of
edges. Note that that problem is structurally rather different from the ones considered
in this paper. For instance, a (weak) Condorcet tree might be identical with a particular
spanning tree proposed by many agents while it might be completely disjoint from
some other proposed spanning trees. Darmann (2014), however, proves that it is NP-
complete to decide if such a tree exists. In this work, by providing coNP-hardness
resultswe show that deciding if a (weak)Condorcet tree exists is also a computationally
hard problem.
The second question is in the spirit of the seminal paper by Bartholdi et al. (1989),
who show that both for the Dodgson and Kemeny voting rule it is NP-hard to decide
if a given candidate is a winner of an election. The related work of Darmann (2013b)
focuses on the second question, in a different framework and using the terminology of
popularity. In particular, Darmann (2013b) provides computational complexity results
for the problem of deciding if a given spanning tree is popular2 with respect to scoring
functions adopted from voting rules, with the focus on approval voting and Borda
voting. The approval voting scenario of Darmann (2013b) is closely related to our
approach, the main difference being that instead of whole spanning trees in Darmann
(2013b) the agents propose single edges (which do not induce a certain structure)
that should be included in the spanning tree. From Darmann (2013b) it follows that
2 In this context, “popular tree” translates into “weak Condorcet tree” in our setting.
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deciding if a given spanning tree is a weak Condorcet tree is coNP-complete already
if each of the agents propose two edges only. The computational complexity of the
problem when the proposed edges form a certain structure, in particular a spanning
tree of the given graph, is not investigated in Darmann (2013b) and, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been studied before. In this work, we add to the result of Darmann
(2013b) by showing that deciding if a given spanning tree is a (weak) Condorcet tree
is coNP-complete if the agents propose a whole solution, i.e., spanning tree, instead
of single edges.3
2 Problem definition
We briefly introduce the formal framework of this paper. An undirected graph G =
(V, E) consists of a finite set V and a set E of two-element subsets of V . We call
the elements of V vertices and the elements of E edges. A subset T ⊆ E with
|E | = |V | − 1 is called a spanning tree of G, if (V, T ) contains no cycle. Note that
for any two spanning trees T1, T2 of G we have |T1 \ T2| = |T2 \ T1|.
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph and let A be a set of agents. For each agent
a ∈ A, we are given a spanning tree Ta of G. Then, a spanning tree T of G is called a
Condorcet tree if for all spanning trees T˜ of G, T˜ = T ,
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |T˜ \ Ta |} > #{a ∈ A : |T˜ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |}
holds. Similarly, a spanning tree T of G is called a weak Condorcet tree, if for all
spanning trees T˜ of G, T˜ = T ,
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |T˜ \ Ta |} ≥ #{a ∈ A : |T˜ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |}
is satisfied. Clearly, a Condorcet tree is also a weak Condorcet tree, but the reverse
does not necessarily hold.
In the first decision problem considered in this paper we ask for the existence of a
Condorcet tree.
Definition 1 (Condorcet-Tree)
GIVEN: Set A of agents, undirected graph G = (V, E), spanning trees Ta of G for a ∈ A.
QUESTION: Is there a Condorcet tree?
Analogously, Weak-Condorcet-Tree is the problem of deciding if there exists a
weak Condorcet tree.
The second type of decision problem we consider is to decide if a given spanning
tree is a (weak) Condorcet tree.
3 From a technical viewpoint, note that the main proofs in Darmann (2013b, 2014) reduce from variants
of 2-Sat, while in our main proof construction we provide a reduction from 3-Unsat.
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Definition 2 (Condorcet-Tree Winner)
GIVEN: Set A of agents, undirected graph G = (V, E),
spanning trees Ta of G for a ∈ A, distinguished
spanning tree T of G.
QUESTION: Is T a Condorcet tree?
Analogously, in Weak-Condorcet-Tree Winner we ask if a given spanning
tree is a weak Condorcet tree.
Let ω : E → N0 be defined by ω(e) := |{a ∈ A : e ∈ Ta}|. As captured by the
lemma below, the candidates for a weak Condorcet tree – and hence for a Condorcet
tree – can be restricted to the set of maximum spanning trees in G with respect to ω,
i.e., spanning trees in G that have the maximum weight with respect to ω.
Lemma 1 If T is a weak Condorcet tree, then T is a maximum spanning tree with
respect to ω.
Proof Assume that in the considered graphG = (V, E), T is not amaximumspanning
tree w.r.t. ω. Then, by the path optimality condition for maximum spanning trees
(cf. Ahuja et al. 1993) there must be an edge e′ = {u, v} ∈ E \ T such that ω(e′) >
ω(e′′) for some edge e′′ contained in the unique path in T which connects the nodes
u and v. Clearly, T ′ := T ∪ {e′} \ {e′′} is again a spanning tree of G. Let AT ′ = {a ∈
A : |T ′ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |} and AT = {a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |T ′ \ Ta |}. Comparing T ′ to
T yields
|AT ′ | − |AT | = ω(e′) − ω(e′′) > 0 .
Hence, T is not a weak Condorcet tree. 	unionsq
Lemma1 is interesting in its own right as similar results have been stated formultiple
referenda (Laffond and Lainé 2009) and committee selection (Brams et al. 2007a, b).
In particular, Laffond and Lainé (2009) generalize a result of Brams et al. (2007a, b)
which states that, using approval ballots and alternative-wise majority voting, the
winning committee maximizes the total sum of the voters’ utilities when individual
utility is measured by the number of alternatives included in the committee.
In what follows, we show that each of the problems Condorcet-Tree, Weak-
Condorcet-Tree,Condorcet-Tree Winner, andWeak-Condorcet-Tree Win-
ner is computationally hard.
3 Computational intractability results
We start by showing that Condorcet-Tree is computationally intractable.































Fig. 1 Graph G in instance V of Condorcet-Tree
Proof We provide a reduction from the coNP-complete problem 3-Unsat, the com-
plement of the classical NP-complete problem 3-Sat. In an instance of 3-Unsat, we
are given a set X of variables and a set C of (disjunctive) clauses made up of exactly 3
literals (a literal is a variable or the negation of a variable in X ); the task is to decide if
C is unsatisfiable, i.e., if there is no truth assignment for X that satisfies all the clauses
in C . 3-Unsat remains coNP-complete if the number of occurrences of each variable
is bounded by 4 (3-Sat is known to be NP-complete under these restrictions (Tovey
1984); obviously, 3-Unsat is coNP-complete under the same restrictions).
Let U = (X,C) be such an instance of 3-Unsat, with X = {x1, . . . , xn} and
C = {C1, . . . ,Cm} for some n,m ∈ N. W.l.o.g. we assume that a clause does not
contain both xt and x¯t for some t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since such a clause is satisfied by any
feasible truth assignment. Let Z be the set of literals, i.e., Z = {xt , x¯t | 1 ≤ t ≤ n}.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we write C j = (z j1 ∨ z j2 ∨ z j3) with z jp ∈ Z , p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We
identify a truth assignment φ with the set of literals set true under φ.
Step I: Constructing instance V of Condorcet-Tree. From U , we construct an
instance V of Condorcet-Tree as follows.
Step Ia: Defining the graph. Let M := m + 2n2 + 5n + 1. First, in order to define a
graph G = (V, E) (see Fig. 1), we set
V := {s} ∪ {st , ut , vt , wt |1 ≤ t ≤ n} ∪ {yt,q | 1 ≤ t ≤ n, 1 ≤ q ≤ M}.
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In addition, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we define the edges rt = {s, st }, bt = {st , ut }, xt =
{ut , wt }, x¯t = {st , wt }, ht = {vt , wt }, and ft,0 = {ut , vt }. Finally, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
1 ≤ q ≤ M , we define the edges dt,q = {yt,q , wt } and ft,q = {yt,q−1, yt,q}, where
yt,0 := vt . Let R := ⋃{rt }, B := ⋃{bt }, H := ⋃{ht } D := ⋃{dt,q}, and F :=⋃{ ft,q}, where the indices in the set unions run over all possible values of t and q
respectively. Identifying a literal with an edge of the same label, we formally define
E := R ∪ B ∪ D ∪ F ∪ H ∪ Z .
Note that |V | = 1 + 4n + nM and |E | = 6n + 2nM . Hence, any spanning tree T˜
of G consists of
|T˜ | = |V | − 1 = n(M + 4) (1)
edges.
Step Ib: Introducing the agents. We introduce a set A = AH ∪ AD ∪ AC ∪ AZ of
agents.
The agent set AH consists ofm+2n2+n agents, each h ∈ AH proposing the same
spanning tree
Th = T = R ∪ B ∪ F ∪ H.
For 1 ≤ q ≤ M , let Dq := {dt,q |1 ≤ t ≤ n}. The next set of agents AC = {γ j |1 ≤
j ≤ m} is such that agent γ j , in order to represent clause C j , proposes the tree
Tγ j := R ∪ B ∪ F ∪ {z j1, z j2 , z j3} ∪ (Dj \ {d j1, j , d j2, j , d j3, j }).
Next, we introduce the 2n2+n agents in AZ , where, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n and 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n+1,
agent ζt,q proposes the spanning tree
Tζt,q := R ∪ F ∪ {xt , x¯t } ∪ (B \ {bt }) ∪ (Dm+(t−1)·(2n+1)+q \ {dt,m+(t−1)·(2n+1)+q}).
Finally, the agents in AD = {δi |1 ≤ i ≤ 4n + 1} are such that δi proposes the
spanning tree
Tδi = R ∪ B ∪ F ∪ Dm+2n2+n+i .
It is not hard to verify that each proposed solution is indeed a spanning tree of G. Note
that
|A| = (m + 2n2 + n) + m + (2n2 + n) + (4n + 1) = 2m + 4n2 + 6n + 1 (2)
holds. In addition, observe that
• each edge in H is contained in the spanning tree T proposed by m + 2n2 + n
agents,
• the set R ∪ F is contained in each of the proposed spanning trees,
• each edge in B is contained in all but 2n+1 of the proposed spanning trees, while
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• each edge in D is contained in at most one proposed spanning tree and
• each edge in Z is contained in at most 2n + 5 of the proposed spanning trees.
From these observations, it is easy to conclude that T is the uniquemaximum spanning
tree w.r.t. the edge weights ω(e), i.e., the only candidate for a Condorcet tree (see
Lemma 1). Note that
• for each h ∈ AH we have |T \ Th | = 0,
• for each γ ∈ AC it holds that |T \ Tγ | = |H | = n,
• for each ζt,q ∈ AZ we have |T \Tζt,q | = |(B∪H)\(B\{bt })| = |H∪{bt }| = n+1,
and
• for each δ ∈ AD , |T \ Tδ| = |H | = n holds.
Step II: Proving the reduction. We complete the proof by showing that the following
claim holds:
U is a “yes”-instance of 3-Unsat if andonly ifV is a “yes”-instance of Condorcet-
Tree.
“⇐”: Let V be a “yes”-instance of Condorcet-Tree. As a consequence, T is the
unique Condorcet tree. Assume that U is a “no”-instance of 3-Unsat, i.e., there is
a truth assignment φ that satisfies all clauses in C . We show that this leads to the
conclusion that T is not a Condorcet tree in V and hence to a contradiction.
Recall that |φ| = n and consider the spanning tree
T ′ := φ ∪ R ∪ F ∪ B.
We can derive the following conclusions concerning the agents in A:
• agents in AC : for each γ j we have |T ′ \ Tγ j | = |φ \ {z j1, z j2 , z j3}| ≤ n − 1, since
the satisfying truth assignment φ contains at least one literal of the clause C j .
Thus, for each γ ∈ AC we have |T ′ \ Tγ | < |T \ Tγ |.
• agents in AZ : for each 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we get
|T ′ \ Tζt,q | = |(φ ∪ B) \ ({xt , x¯t } ∪ B \ {bt })|
= |{bt } ∪ (φ \ {xt , x¯t })|
= 1 + (n − 1)
= n
because per definition φ contains exactly one of {xt , x¯t } for each t . Hence, for each
ζ ∈ AZ we have |T ′ \ Tζ | < |T \ Tζ |.
• agents in AD: for each δ ∈ AD , |T ′ \ Tδ| = |φ| = n holds. Thus, for each δ ∈ AD
we have |T ′ \ Tδ| = |T \ Tδ|.
On the other hand, the agents in AH propose the spanning tree T . Hence, we get
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |T ′ \ Ta |} = |AH | = m + 2n2 + n
and
#{a ∈ A : |T ′ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |} = |AC | + |AZ | = m + 2n2 + n.
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Thus, T is not a Condorcet tree. Hence there is no Condorcet tree in V , which
contradicts our assumption. As a consequence, U must be a “yes”-instance of 3-
Unsat.
“⇒”: Let V be a “no”-instance of Condorcet-Tree. Thus, T is not a Condorcet
tree, i.e., there must be a spanning tree Tˆ = T such that
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta |} ≤ #{a ∈ A : |Tˆ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |} (3)
holds. Clearly, all a ∈ AH have |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta |. Hence, (3) implies
#{a ∈ A : |Tˆ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |} ≥ |AH |. (4)
The proof proceeds in four steps.
(i) First, we show that we can assume that Tˆ ∩ H = ∅. Assume Tˆ ∩ H = ∅.
Create the spanning tree T ′ of G from Tˆ by replacing each edge ht ∈ H by an edge
e ∈ { ft,0, xt } which (a) is not included in Tˆ and (b) satisfies that Tˆ ∪ {e} \ {ht } is in
fact a spanning tree of G. Obviously, |T \ Ta | < |T ′ \ Ta | and |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta | hold
for a ∈ AH . However, since there is no tree proposed by an agent in A \ AH which
contains an edge in H , we have
|T ′ \ Ta | ≤ |Tˆ \ Ta |
for a ∈ A \ AH . Hence,
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |T ′ \ Ta |} ≤ #{a ∈ A : |T ′ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |}
holds as well.
(ii) Second, we show that (R ∪ B ∪ F) ⊂ Tˆ holds. By construction, R ⊂ Tˆ . Let
κ := |(B ∪ F) \ Tˆ |. Assume that κ ≥ 1 holds.
If κ > n, then each δ ∈ AD has |T \Tδ| = n < κ ≤ |Tˆ \Tδ|, because [(B∪F)\Tˆ ] ⊆
(Tδ \ Tˆ ) and |Tδ \ Tˆ | = |Tˆ \ Tδ| hold. Thus,
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta |} ≥ |AH | + |AD|




because the total number of agents is |A| = 2m + 4n2 + 6n + 1 (stated in (2)). This
contradicts (3).
Hence, κ ≤ n must hold. However, Tˆ can have a non-empty intersection with at
most 2n from the sets Dm+2n2+n+i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4n + 1, because otherwise Tˆ contains at
least
|R| + (|B ∪ F | − κ) + (2n + 1) = n + (n + n(M + 1) − κ) + (2n + 1)
= nM + 5n + 1 − κ
≥ nM + 4n + 1
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edges, which contradicts (1). Hence, for at least 2n + 1 agents δi ∈ AD — i.e., for at
least 2n + 1 of the indices i ∈ {1, . . . , 4n + 1}) — we have |Tˆ \ Tδi | = |Tδi \ Tˆ | =
κ + |Dm+2n2+n+i | ≥ 1 + n. Since |T \ Tδ| = n holds for each δ ∈ AD ,
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta |} ≥ |AH | + 2n + 1




follows. Again this contradicts (3). Thus, κ = 0, i.e., (B ∪ F) ⊂ Tˆ and hence
(R ∪ B ∪ F) ⊂ Tˆ holds.
(iii) Third, we show that |{xt , x¯t } ∩ Tˆ | = 1 holds for each 1 ≤ t ≤ n. From
B ⊂ Tˆ (see (ii)), it follows that |{xt , x¯t } ∩ Tˆ | ≤ 1 holds for each 1 ≤ t ≤ n, because
otherwise Tˆ would contain a cycle which contradicts with the fact that Tˆ is a spanning
tree. Assume that for some t , |{xt , x¯t } ∩ Tˆ | = 0 holds. By (ii), Eq. (1) implies that
Tˆ can have a non-empty intersection with at most n from the sets Dm+(t−1)(2n+1)+q ,
1 ≤ q ≤ 2n + 1. Thus, for at least n + 1 indices q ∈ {1, . . . , 2n + 1} we have
|Tζt,q \ Tˆ | = |{xt , x¯t } ∪ {Dm+(t−1)·(2n+1)+q \ {dt,m+(t−1)·(2n+1)+q}|
= 2 + (n − 1)
= n + 1.
Recalling that |Tˆ \ Tζt,q | = |Tζt,q \ Tˆ | holds, we hence can conclude that |Tˆ \ Tζt,q | =
|T \ Tζt,q | is satisfied for at least n + 1 agents in AZ .
Analogously, Tˆ can have a non-empty intersection with at most n from the sets
Dm+2n2+n+i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4n+ 1. Thus, at most n of the voters δ ∈ AD have |Tˆ \ Tδ| < n
and hence |Tˆ \ Tδ| < |T \ Tδ|. As a consequence, we get
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta |} ≥ |AH | = m + 2n2 + n
while
#{a ∈ A : |Tˆ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |} ≤ |AC | + (|AZ | − (n + 1)) + n
= m + (2n2 + n − n − 1) + n
= m + 2n2 + n − 1.
Therewith,
#{a ∈ A : |T \ Ta | < |Tˆ \ Ta |} > #{a ∈ A : |Tˆ \ Ta | < |T \ Ta |}
holds, which contradicts (3).
(iv) Finally, from Tˆ we derive a truth assignment φ that satisfies all clauses in C .
Let φ := Z ∩ Tˆ . From (iii), we know that for each 1 ≤ t ≤ n, exactly one of {xt , x¯t }
is contained in φ. In other words, |φ| = n holds and φ is a feasible truth assignment.
In addition, (iii) implies that (D ∪ H) ∩ Tˆ = ∅ holds because otherwise (1) would
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be violated. Hence, we can write Tˆ as Tˆ = R ∪ B ∪ F ∪ φ. Consider the agents in
A \ AC :
• for each agent h ∈ AH we have |Tˆ \ Th | = n, whereas |T \ Th | = 0; i.e.,
|T \ Th | < |Tˆ \ Th |.
• for each agent ζt,q ∈ AZ we have |Tˆ \Tζt,q | = |(φ\{xt , x¯t })∪{bt }| = (n−1)+1 =
n, whereas |T \ Tζt,q | = 1 + n; i.e., |Tˆ \ Tζt,q | < |T \ Tζt,q |.
• for each agent δ ∈ AD we have |T \ Tδ| = |Tˆ \ Tδ| = n.
As a result, due to |AH | = m + 2n2 + n and |AZ | = 2n2 + n, in order to satisfy (3)
each agent γ ∈ AC must have |Tˆ \ Tγ | < |T \ Tγ | = n. Because of D ∩ Tˆ = ∅, the
only possibility to achieve this is that, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, at least one of the edges
{z j1, z j2 , z j3} is contained in Tˆ . In other words, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, at least one of
the variables {z j1, z j2 , z j3} that make up clause C j must be contained in, i.e., set true
under φ. Thus, φ satisfies all clauses in C , i.e., U is a “no”-instance of 3-Unsat. 	unionsq
In the following theorem, we state an analogous result for Weak-Condorcet-
Tree.
Theorem 2 Weak-Condorcet-Tree is coNP-hard.
Proof The proof follows from the one of Theorem 1 by removing exactly one agent
from the set AH . 	unionsq
We now turn to the problems of deciding whether a given spanning tree is a (weak)
Condorcet tree. These problems turn out to be coNP-complete.
Theorem 3 Condorcet-Tree Winner is coNP-complete.
Proof In the proof of Theorem 1, there is exactly one candidate for a Condorcet tree
in instance V , i.e., the spanning tree T . Thus, in instance V the answer to question
(Q1) “Is there a Condorcet tree?” is “Yes” if and only if the answer to (Q2) “Is T a
Condorcet tree?” is “Yes”. It is hence straightforward that Condorcet-Tree Winner
is coNP-hard.
Finally,membership in coNP is easy to verify. LetC be an instance of Condorcet-
Tree Winner, where we ask if TC is a Condorcet tree. If C is a “no”-instance, then
any tree T ′ which satisfies #{a ∈ A : |TC \ Ta | < |T ′ \ Ta |} ≤ #{a ∈ A : |T ′ \ Ta | <
|TC \ Ta |} serves as certificate. 	unionsq
Analogously, with (the proof of) Theorem 2 we get the following result.
Theorem 4 Weak-Condorcet-Tree Winner is coNP-complete.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that both deciding if a (weak) Condorcet tree exists and deciding if a
given spanning tree is a (weak) Condorcet tree, are computationally difficult problems.
While the latter problems turn out to be coNP-complete, our coNP-hardness results
for Condorcet-Tree and Weak-Condorcet-Tree only provide lower bounds for
their computational complexity. A finer placement of these problems in terms of their
computational complexity is an interesting open question.
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